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MORAL INTUITIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
MILTON C. REGAN, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers both shape and are shaped by the organizational environments in 
which they practice.  They often play important roles in creating and operating 
ethics and legal compliance programs.  Those programs in turn affect the 
milieu in which the lawyer must carry on her work.  We can think of this 
milieu in a broad sense as an organization’s culture.  Many efforts to 
understand and respond to a succession of corporate scandals over the last few 
years have underscored the importance of organizational culture in shaping the 
behavior of individuals.1 This focus reflects appreciation that even if an 
 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  My thanks to Carol Needham for 
inviting me to submit a paper based on my participation on the Association of American Law 
Schools panel in January 2007 that she organized.  The panel served as the impetus for this 
article.  I am grateful to Elizabeth Chambliss, Donald Langevoort, Susan Martyn, and John 
Mikhail for comments on an earlier draft. 
  This article is dedicated to the memory of Father Robert F. Drinan, S.J., whose moral 
intuitions never failed him. 
 1. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Responsibility of Corporations 
and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 
RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2003); Christine E. Early, Kate Odabashian & Michael Willenborg, Some 
Thoughts on the Audit Failure at Enron, the Demise of Andersen, and the Ethical Climate of 
Public Accounting Firms, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1013 (2003); Ronald R. Sims & Johannes 
Brinkman, Enron Ethics (Or: Culture Matters More than Codes), 45 J. BUS. ETHICS 243 (2003); 
William Arthur Wines & J. Brooke Hamilton III, Observations on the Need to Redesign 
Organizations and to Refocus Corporation Law to Promote Ethical Behavior and Discourage 
Illegal Conduct, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 43 (2003).  A related concept is an organization’s “ethical 
infrastructure.”  See, e.g., Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Kristin Smith-Crowe & Elizabeth E. Umphress, 
Building Houses on Rocks: The Role of the Ethical Infrastructure in Organizations, 16 SOC. 
JUST. RES. 285, 286–87 (2003). 
  For elaboration of this concept as applied to law firms, see Elizabeth Chambliss, The 
Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119 (2005); Elizabeth 
Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 335 (2003); Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics 
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 559 (2002); Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical 
Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691 
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organization has adopted elaborate rules and policies designed to ensure legal 
compliance and ethical behavior, those pronouncements will be ineffective if 
other norms and incentives promote contrary conduct. 
Enron, for example, had a supposedly state-of-the-art ethics code, risk 
management capability, and board of directors oversight process, all of which 
formally conveyed the importance of ethical behavior.  The company also, 
however, provided lavish rewards for employees who could negotiate deals 
that resulted in immediate recognition of revenue and conducted a “rank and 
yank” personnel evaluation process that engendered brutal competition.2  The 
result was a poisonous culture that spawned disdain for legal and accounting 
rules, as well as for any broader conception of ethics. 
“Culture,” as one set of scholars observes, “helps to establish what is 
considered legitimate or unacceptable in an organization.”3  In this respect, 
Enron’s culture overwhelmed whatever formal ethics and compliance 
measures that it had adopted.  Crucial in identifying a corporation’s culture, 
suggests another observer, are: 
the employees’ perceptions of the corporation’s values—as reflected by the 
corporation’s mission statement and code of ethics, the criteria for business 
decisions, the words and actions of leaders, the handling of conflicts of 
interest, the reward system, the guidance provided to employees concerning 
dealing with ethical issues, and the monitoring system.4 
Amendments to the Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 2004 
are consistent with a broad focus that looks beyond formal programs to more 
complex influences on behavior.  They add to the criteria for an effective legal 
compliance and ethics program the requirement that an organization “promote 
an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to 
compliance with the law.”5 
Responding to the call for creating and sustaining an ethical culture in 
organizations requires appreciating the subtle ways in which various 
characteristics of an organization may work in tandem or at cross-purposes in 
shaping behavior.  The idea is to identify the influences likely to be most 
important, analyze how people are apt to respond to them, and revise them if 
 
(2002); Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the “Ethical 
Infrastructure” of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245 (1998). 
 2. See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE 
ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003). 
 3. LINDA KLEBE TREVIÑO & GARY RICHARD WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS IN BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS: SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 235 (2003). 
 4. Dallas, supra note 1, at 3. 
 5. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2) (2006); see also David Hess, 
Robert S. McWhorter & Timothy L. Fort, The 2004 Amendments to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and Their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic Integration of Business Ethics, 11 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 725, 726 (2006). 
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necessary so that they create the right kinds of incentives when individuals are 
deciding how to act. 
This can be a tall order even if we assume that most behavior is the result 
of a deliberative process that weighs multiple risks and rewards.  It is even 
more daunting if we accept the notion that conscious deliberation typically 
plays but a minor role in shaping behavior.  A focus on what two scholars 
describe as “the unbearable automaticity of being” posits that “most of a 
person’s everyday life is determined not by their conscious intentions and 
deliberate choices but by mental processes that are put into motion by features 
of the environment and that operate outside of conscious awareness and 
guidance.”6 
A growing body of scholarship, described as cognitive psychology or 
behavioral economics, has focused on various cognitive tendencies that reflect 
the operation of these non-conscious processes.7  It has analyzed, for instance, 
how such certain biases can obscure morally salient features of a situation, and 
how they can undermine a sense of personal responsibility even when a person 
recognizes issues of moral concern.8  Several scholars also have described how 
organizational settings can accentuate these propensities.9  This work suggests 
 
 6. John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 462, 462 (1999). 
 7. See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (6th ed. 
2006); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); 
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal 
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Hugh Schwartz, Behavioral 
Economics in a Nutshell: The Complicating But Sometimes Critical Considerations (Jan. 20, 
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=960222; Cass R. Sunstein, 
Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECOMONICS 1 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
 8. See, e.g., Mahzarin R. Banaji, Max H. Bazerman & Dolly Chugh, How (Un)Ethical Are 
You?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2003, at 56; Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of 
Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. 
REV. 629 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, 
and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001); 
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead 
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1998); Donald 
C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’ Responsibility for 
Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993); David J. Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, 
in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 94 (Deborah L. 
Rhode ed., 2000); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1321–25 
(2006); Ann E. Tensbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in 
Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223 (2004). 
 9. See, e.g., CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS (David 
M. Messick & Ann E. Tensbrunsel eds., 1996); CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND 
SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Don A. Moore, Daylian M. 
Cain, George Lowenstein & Max H. Bazerman eds., 2005); SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL 
BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS (John M. Darley, David M. Messick & Tom R. Tyler eds., 2001); 
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that there are predictable patterns of both cognition and behavior that spring 
from non-conscious sources, and that these patterns can persist despite 
conscious awareness of their existence. 
The durability of these patterns poses a challenge to any effort to foster an 
ethical organizational culture.  We have to think carefully about when certain 
tendencies are likely to arise, what impacts they are likely to have, and if and 
how they might be amenable to influence. In some cases, we may want to 
counteract these tendencies.  So, for instance, we may try to reduce the 
influence of self-serving rationalizations by ensuring that a dialogue includes 
contributions from people with no stake in the outcome of a project.  In other 
cases, we may want to capitalize on a certain propensity.  Thus, we may want 
to ensure that people in formal positions of authority, or in leadership positions 
within groups, model commitment to certain important values because people 
are likely to take their behavioral cues from such individuals.  In still other 
cases, habits may stubbornly resist attempts to change them, so we need to 
think carefully how to work around especially tenacious behavior.  In this way, 
work on cognitive psychology and behavioral economics can inform our 
attempts to promote legal compliance and ethical behavior. 
In this article, I want to discuss another strand of research that is rooted in 
the study of non-conscious mental processes, and to consider its implications 
for ethics and culture in the organizational setting.  This is work on the process 
that we use to identify and respond to situations that raise what we think of as 
distinctly moral questions.  A growing body of research suggests that a large 
portion of this process involves automatic non-conscious cognitive and 
emotional reactions rather than conscious deliberation.  One way to think of 
these reactions is that they reflect reliance on moral intuitions.10  When such 
intuitions arise, we do not engage in moral reasoning in order to arrive at a 
conclusion.  Instead, we do so in order to justify a conclusion that we have 
already reached.  In other words, moral conclusions precede, rather than 
follow, moral reasoning. 
If this research accurately captures much of our moral experience, what 
does it suggest about what is necessary to foster an ethical organizational 
culture?  At first blush, the implications seem unsettling.  The non-conscious 
realm is commonly associated with irrational and arbitrary impulses, and 
morality often is characterized as the hard-won achievement of reason over 
these unruly forces.  If most of our moral judgments are the product of non-
conscious processes, how can we hope to understand, much less influence, our 
moral responses?  Are moral reactions fundamentally inscrutable and beyond 
appeals to reason?  If reason has no persuasive force, does appreciation of the 
 
James A. Fanto, Corporate Misbehavior by Elite Decision-Makers Symposium: Perspectives from 
Law and Social Psychology, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1165 (2005). 
 10. See infra note 34. 
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non-conscious source of our moral judgments suggest that any effort to 
promote ethical conduct must rest on a crude behaviorism that manipulates 
penalties and rewards? 
I believe that acknowledging the prominent role of non-conscious 
processes in shaping moral responses need not inevitably lead either to fatalism 
or Skinnerian behaviorism.  Research has begun to shed light on how these 
processes operate.  Related work has suggested how our moral responses may 
be rooted in human evolution.  This perspective focuses on the ways in which 
our capacity for moral judgment is embedded in physical and mental processes 
that have provided an adaptive advantage in human evolution.11  These bodies 
of research contribute to a richer portrait of human cognition and behavior that 
can be valuable in thinking about how to promote ethical awareness and 
conduct.  As with work in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, a 
more refined appreciation of human tendencies—both their operation and their 
possible origins—”may help us to better understand what educational and 
policy interventions may facilitate good conduct and ameliorate bad 
conduct.”12 
It is important at the outset to emphasize that gaining a more subtle 
understanding of the process of making moral judgments does not mean that 
this process should have any privileged status in our ethical deliberation.  That 
we tend to reach such judgments in a certain way does not mean that we should 
do so.  This “naturalistic fallacy” has been subject to trenchant criticism; I 
agree that we cannot derive an ought from an is.13  How we are is not 
necessarily how we would like to be.  Indeed, morality can be seen as an effort 
to bridge the gap.  Nor do the possible evolutionary functions of cognitive and 
behavioral tendencies mean that we should automatically defer to them.  Aside 
from the pitfalls of the naturalistic fallacy, those tendencies may have emerged 
and played a role at a stage in human evolution far different from our current 
circumstances.  What once was functional may no longer be, and in fact may 
be dysfunctional in certain ways. 
 
 11. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, NATURAL ETHICAL FACTS: EVOLUTION, 
CONNECTIONISM, AND MORAL COGNITION (2003); ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN 
REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988); SHAUN NICHOLS, SENTIMENTAL 
RULES: ON THE NATURAL FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL JUDGMENT (2004); MATT RIDLEY, THE 
ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1996); JAMES 
Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1993).  Many theorists in this camp tend to claim David Hume 
as an ancestor because of his emphasis on morality as the expression of an innate sentiment.  See 
DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (Kessinger Publishing 
2004) (1751). 
 12. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches (Apr. 
19, 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-psych-emp/. 
 13. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1888); 
GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA (Cambridge Univ. Press 1966) (1903). 
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What I am claiming is that, as Owen Flanagan puts it, “seeing clearly the 
kinds of persons we are is a necessary condition for any productive ethical 
reflection.”14  If there were such a thing as a normative theory of human 
movement, it would be futile if it exhorted us to fly.15  Efforts to create an 
organizational culture that encouraged people to fly would be doomed as well.  
In thinking about ethics, we need to have a sense of what lies between simply 
accommodating what we tend to do and demanding that we fly.16  Disciplines 
such as anthropology, evolutionary biology, cognitive science, primatology, 
and neurology all can offer guidance for this project, even as we remain free to 
decide what prescriptive significance to attach to their descriptive insights.  
Aside from enhanced self-understanding, these insights may suggest what 
kinds of efforts to promote ethical behavior are most likely to be successful 
because they either counteract or build on durable human tendencies. 
In this article, I want to suggest one way in which research on moral 
intuitions might inform our understanding of the possibilities of and limits on 
efforts to foster an ethical organizational culture.  This suggestion is cautious 
and tentative.  I am well aware of the perils of attempting to extrapolate from 
other disciplines with which I am not intimately familiar, especially when 
those disciplines themselves are not characterized by consensus.  I take some 
comfort from the fact that my conclusion is consistent with one prominent 
account of organizational life, even if I arrive at that conclusion by a different 
route.  In any event, my main purpose is to stimulate further thought and to 
encourage research on the implications of the role of intuitions in ethical 
judgment and behavior.17 
Before I begin, it is worth identifying some simplifying assumptions that I 
will adopt in the hope of sketching the broad outlines of lessons that research 
on moral intuitions might offer.  These assumptions are embedded in the 
statement that I will focus on the implications of this research for attempts to 
 
 14. OWEN FLANAGAN, VARIETIES OF MORAL PERSONALITY: ETHICS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REALISM 16 (1991). 
 15. One common way of expressing this idea is that “ought implies can.”  See Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong, ‘“Ought” Conversationally Implies “Can”’, 93 PHIL. REV. 249 (1984).  
While the maxim is not without controversy, it seems to capture at least a commonsensical, if not 
logical, insight.  See id. 
 16. As Owen Flanagan suggests, a Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism provides: 
“Make sure when constructing a moral theory or projecting a moral ideal that the character, 
decision processing, and behavior prescribed are possible, or are perceived to be possible, for 
creatures like us.”  FLANAGAN, supra note 14, at 32. 
 17. Some scholars in business ethics have already begun to take work on moral intuitions 
into account.  See Scott J. Reynolds,  A Neurocognitive Model of the Ethical Decision-Making 
Process: Implications for Study and Practice, 91 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 737 (2006); Scott 
Sonenshein, The Role of Construction, Intuition, and Justification in Responding to Ethical Issues 
at Work: The Sensemaking-Intuition Model, ACAD. MGMT. REV. (forthcoming) (May 2006 
manuscript on file with author). 
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promote an “ethical organizational culture.”  Each of the terms in quotation 
marks is more complex than I will treat it in this article. 
First, I will treat the “organization” as a single actor, when of course it can 
act only through numerous individuals.  These individuals are unlikely to be 
unanimous about what courses of action the organization should pursue, and 
would face challenges in coordinating their efforts even if they were.  Both 
formal and informal structures of power shape and constrain what any 
individual or group can do.  Any initiative has to be undertaken on many fronts 
and contend with a multitude of attitudes and responses.  Those who would 
have an organization attempt to encourage ethical behavior thus need to 
consider carefully the levers and avenues of influence to employ in this effort. 
A second point, related to the first, is that I will speak of an “ethical” 
culture as a discrete state of affairs, presumably in contrast to one that is not 
ethical. This binary distinction does not hold up in the real world.  
Organizations typically are not either ethical or unethical.  An organization is 
likely to speak in many voices with multiple messages.  Some may explicitly 
relate to ethics; many others will not, but may indirectly communicate 
something about ethical expectations.  There will be shades of emphasis and 
nuances of meaning, and no two individuals are likely to “read” the culture in 
exactly the same way.  A more precise formulation thus may be that we should 
consider how organizations might heighten the importance of ethical 
considerations in their operations, rather than how they can move their cultures 
into the ethical category. 
Finally, I will tend to portray organizational “culture” as a relatively 
monolithic phenomenon.  This suggests a relative unity of purpose that 
distinguishes one organization from another.  As Joanne Martin observes, 
however, this is only one of at least three different perspectives on 
organizational culture.18  It represents an “integration perspective,” which 
“sees consensus (although not necessarily unanimity) throughout an 
organization.”19  From this perspective, each element of the organization 
mutually reinforces the others. 
By contrast, a “differentiation perspective” is sensitive to inconsistent 
interpretations within an organization.20  From this perspective, consensus 
exists only on the subcultural level.21  Subcultures “may exist in harmony, 
independently, or in conflict with each other.”22  They “are like islands of 
clarity in a sea of ambiguity.”23  Finally, a “fragmentation perspective” 
 
 18. See JOANNE MARTIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: MAPPING THE TERRAIN 94 (2002). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. MARTIN, supra note 18, at 94. 
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emphasizes ambiguity, treating consensus as “transient and issue specific.”24  It 
conceptualizes the relationships among different constituencies and structures 
of the organization as neither clearly consistent nor clearly inconsistent.25 
As Martin suggests, each of these perspectives provides insights on 
organizational life, and each has its blind spots.  Some aspects of culture will 
be shared by most members, others will be interpreted by different groups, and 
still others “will be interpreted ambiguously, with irony, paradox, and 
irreconcilable tensions.”26  She suggests that researchers should attempt to use 
all three perspectives simultaneously because this will provide a richer set of 
insights than any single viewpoint.27  My analysis will focus on organizations 
generally, rather than any particular one, but I acknowledge that any given 
organization will exhibit the complex and layered sets of meanings that Martin 
describes. 
I.  MORAL INTUITIONISM 
A. The Influence of Non-Conscious Cognition 
A substantial body of work in cognitive psychology and behavioral 
economics underscores that many of our cognitive and behavioral tendencies 
are the product of processes that occur outside our awareness.28  Many of these 
tendencies are intensified in the organizational setting, with the result that 
people working in an organization face distinctive challenges in recognizing 
and acting upon ethical issues.29 
Virtually any organization of significant size, for instance, will feature 
some fragmentation of knowledge.  People who occupy different roles may 
have an understanding of some features of a situation but not all of them.  Like 
the individuals in contact with various parts of the proverbial elephant, each 
may have a distinctive but incomplete belief about what is going on. 
In addition, organizations typically are characterized by diffusion of 
responsibilities.  Those who occupy different roles will tend to seek out only 
the information they regard as necessary for their work.  Indeed, in a world of 
accelerating flows of information, doing so can become a necessity for being 
able to function.  How many of us, for instance, hit the delete button after only 
a second’s perusal of the content—or even subject heading—of all the emails 
we receive each day?  This self-protective reflex may insulate people even 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. at 120. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See, e.g., TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE 
ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS (2002); Reynolds, supra note 17; Sonenshein, supra note 17. 
 29. See infra Part II. 
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more deeply within the perspectives and attitudes of their roles, and may create 
a disincentive to seek information that does not seem directly relevant. 
These propensities can complicate the ability to recognize the salience of 
ethical considerations in a given situation, as well as the willingness to act on 
the basis of them.  Absent the rare entity that is thoroughly corrupt, most daily 
behavior can be interpreted in terms of organizational routines that raise no 
ethical issues.  Identifying such issues therefore requires an individual to 
escape the interpretive grip of these routines in order to identify anomalies that 
may signal matters of ethical significance. 
Acknowledging that a situation raises ethical concerns takes mental and 
emotional energy.  It means that we cannot rely on our comfortable cognitive 
and behavioral routines.  Instead, we have to focus more self-consciously on 
what the situation means and what it may require of us.  It also means that we 
may have to question those with whom we have social relationships or defend 
ourselves to them, placing us both in the potentially awkward and stressful 
position of making ethical judgments about one another.  All things 
considered, most people are inclined to avoid being in this situation if they can. 
Several psychological mechanisms help us do so.  In general, people rely 
on social and organizational “scripts” to organize experience and make it 
intelligible.30  If a situation “involves a familiar class of problems or issues, it 
is likely to be handled via existing cognitive structures or scripts—scripts that 
typically include no ethical component in their cognitive content.”31  In 
addition, people have a robust capacity for using “self-serving cognitive 
frames” in order to “attenuate or mitigate their perceptions of duty and 
obligation.”32  These frames enable them to maintain a positive self-image of 
themselves as “rational, blameless, and consistent decision makers.”33 
Recent research has focused on moral judgment in particular as one 
domain in which non-conscious processes play a prominent role.34  It suggests 
 
 30. See Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed 
Opportunities, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 385 (1992), 
 31. Id. at 388 (emphasis in original). 
 32. Roderick M. Kramer & David M. Messick, Ethical Cognition and the Framing of 
Organizational Dilemmas: Decision Makers as Intuitive Lawyers, in CODES OF CONDUCT, supra 
note 9, at 59, 69. 
 33. Id. at 70. 
 34. See, e.g., Max Bazerman & Maharzin R. Banaji, The Social Psychology of Ordinary 
Ethical Failures, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 111 (2004); Fiery Cushman et al., The Role of Conscious 
Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082 (2006); Joshua Greene, 
From Neural “Is” to Moral “Ought”: What are the Moral Implications of Neuroscientific Moral 
Psychology?, 4 NATURE REV.  NEUROSCIENCE 847 (2003); Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog 
and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 
814 (2001) [hereinafter Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail]; Jonathan Haidt, The 
Emotional Dog Gets Mistaken for a Possum, 8 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 283 (2004); Jonathan Haidt 
& Fredrik Bjorklund, Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions about Moral Psychology, in 3 
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that only a small percentage of what we think of as judgments about situations 
with potential moral implications is the product of reasoned analysis.35  
Instead, most judgments reflect immediate intuitive reactions, which 
individuals then justify post hoc by recourse to what they regard as socially 
acceptable reasons.36  On this account, a good portion of what we think of as 
moral reasoning therefore consists not of efforts to decide what to do, but of 
attempts to rationalize what we have already done or committed ourselves to 
do. 
This research should give pause to those who are interested in promoting 
ethical organizational cultures.  First, many ethical appeals are designed to 
affect conscious deliberation.  A substantial body of scholarship in business 
and legal ethics, for instance, is devoted to clarifying morally relevant features 
of various situations, providing systematic ways of reasoning about those 
features, and justifying conclusions about how they should be reconciled.37  
Unless we engage people’s intuitions, however, such ethical appeals may not 
have much effect on behavior.  Rather, they may simply add to the repertoire 
of justifications that people are able to offer after they have already reached a 
conclusion.  Second, to the extent that such ethical appeals do influence 
behavior rather than simply provide rationalizations, they may have to do so by 
triggering intuitions rather than by presenting convincing logical arguments.  
Engaging in the latter process is an activity that is probably more familiar to us 
than participating in the first. 
Promoting ethical behavior in organizations thus would seem to require 
better understanding of potentially powerful non-conscious processes that 
shape our moral intuitions.  An emerging body of work has tried to determine 
more precisely how non-conscious processes operate and the role they play in 
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moral cognition.38  This research is suggestive, rather than definitive.  It holds 
some promise, however, for illuminating these processes, for rethinking some 
conventional assumptions about ethics, and for identifying ways in which we 
might try to strengthen or undermine non-conscious cognitive operations to 
enhance the likelihood of ethical behavior. 
B. Elements of Moral Experience 
One useful way of approaching this research is to begin with a widely-used 
framework that depicts moral experience as comprised of four elements: moral 
awareness, moral judgment or reasoning, moral motivation, and moral 
behavior.39  In some cases, we can think of these elements as steps in a 
sequence that culminates in behavior.  In other cases—those with which I am 
most concerned here—this framework describes a process in which the four 
elements appear to occur simultaneously. 
The first element is moral awareness.40  This is the point at which an 
individual recognizes that she is confronting a situation with a moral 
dimension.41  This awareness is the product of an interaction between 
individual characteristics and contextual cues.42  Different combinations of 
variables can stimulate or repress ethical awareness.43  “[I]dentifying a moral 
issue” thus involves “an interpretive process wherein the individual recognizes 
that a moral problem exists in a situation, or that a moral standard or principle 
is relevant to the circumstances.”44 
Understanding moral awareness has been refined by appreciation of the 
extent to which people engage in the process of “sensemaking.”45  We all are 
confronted with multiple stimuli in our environment, and we must impose 
some structure upon it for it to “make sense.”46  We use various cues, patterns, 
routines, and scripts, typically created jointly with others, to help us 
accomplish this task.  We still, however, may encounter stimuli that do not fit 
 
 38. See, e.g., Cordelia Fine, Is the Emotional Dog Wagging Its Rational Tail, or Chasing It? 
Reason in Moral Judgment, 9 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 83 (2006); Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 
34; Reynolds, supra note 17. 
 39. JAMES REST ET AL., POSTCONVENTIONAL MORAL THINKING: A NEO-KOHLBERGIAN 
APPROACH (1999); Linda K. Treviño et al., Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J. 
MGMT. 951, 952 (2006). 
 40. See Treviño et al., supra note 39, at 953. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. at 953–54. 
 43. See id. at 954. 
 44. Id. at 953. 
 45. On sense-making generally, see KARL E. WEICK, SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS 
(1995); Karl E. Weick et al., Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking, 16 ORG. SCI. 409 
(2005).  For an application of the concept to ethics in the organizational context, see Sonenshein, 
supra note 17. 
 46. See Weick et al., supra note 45. 
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comfortably into any of these structures.  We may, for instance, encounter 
equivocality: “the existence of several different, simultaneous 
interpretations.”47  Or we may confront uncertainty: “a lack of information that 
makes constructing a plausible interpretation about a situation difficult.”48 
The relevant point about sensemaking for my purposes is that moral 
awareness is not simply a matter of seeing or failing to see moral issues that 
inhere in a situation independently of perception.  Instead, it’s the result of a 
process of active construction that involves complex interaction among an 
individual, her environment, and other people. 
The second element in a framework of moral experience is moral 
judgment, or moral reasoning.49  Once a person acknowledges the existence of 
a moral issue, she attempts to determine the most appropriate response to that 
issue.  What demands does the situation make on her and/or others?  What 
should she do in order to act morally?  Much work in ethics that focuses on 
this element is prescriptive, attempting to provide either decision procedures or 
substantive principles for resolving moral questions. 
On the descriptive level, Kohlberg’s theory of stages of moral reasoning is 
perhaps the most prominent effort to describe various levels of competence in 
moral judgment.50  That theory depicts advancement in moral reasoning as a 
process of appreciating a successively more abstract set of concerns that can be 
increasingly universalized (and thus includes a prescriptive element as well).51  
Other research has focused on what kinds of issues, circumstances, and 
individual values and characteristics tend to be correlated with different forms 
of moral reasoning.52  In addition, an increasingly substantial body of work has 
examined various types of cognitive biases and self-protective mechanisms 
that can influence deliberation.53 
The third element is moral motivation.54  Having determined the ethically 
appropriate course of action, someone then must be motivated to act upon that 
conclusion.  She must feel obligated to “tak[e] the moral course of action,”55 
and form the intention to do so. 
Cognitive dissonance can be a source of moral motivation, as a person is 
moved to act in order to maintain consistency between her behavior and her 
 
 47. Sonenshein, supra note 17, at 7. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Treviño et al., supra note 39, at 952. 
 50. LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE NATURE 
AND VALIDITY OF MORAL STAGES 43 & tbl. 1.2 (1984). 
 51. See id. 
 52. Treviño et al., supra note 39, at 956–57. 
 53. Id. at 958–59. 
 54. Id. at 954. 
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sense of identity.56  Emotion can play an even more important role in this 
process.57  Guilt, shame, anger at injustice, and other emotions can provide the 
necessary motivation to follow through on the response that one has deemed 
appropriate.58  Acknowledgement of the part that emotion can play in moral 
responses reflects a movement away from schools of thought that regard 
emotion as antithetical to principled moral action.59 
The final element in the framework is moral behavior: “the transition from 
merely having moral intentions to actually engaging in moral action.”60  
Individual characteristics such as the strength of a sense of personal 
responsibility and the capacity for self-regulation can influence whether this 
occurs.61  So can environmental factors such as perceived support for and 
consequences of a course of behavior, the available pattern of rewards and 
punishments, and the conduct of others in a person’s reference group.62  In 
addition, unmet organizational goals can contribute to unethical behavior, 
especially when individuals are just slightly short of achieving a goal.63 
Research has shed light on how organizational structure and culture can 
affect each of the elements in this analytical framework.  It provides insights 
on how we might enhance ethical awareness, improve ethical reasoning, 
provide motivation to act ethically, and encourage following through on an 
intention to act.  This work can help identify initiatives that focus on each 
separate element that forms the chain that culminates in behavior. 
Current research, however, suggests that much, perhaps most, of our 
ethically relevant behavior is not the result of a sequence in which these steps 
occur one after the other.  Rather, it is the product of a process of which we are 
not consciously aware. In this process, ethical awareness, judgment, 
motivation, and behavior occur virtually simultaneously.  Moral reasoning, as 
one scholar puts it, “is not left free to search for truth but is likely to be hired 
out like a lawyer by various motives, employed only to seek confirmation of 
preordained conclusions.”64 
People in many cases therefore are not reliable reporters of the process in 
which they make moral judgments, but are unaware of that process as it is 
occurring.  If these operations occur outside of our consciousness, are they also 
outside our control?  Are most moral responses the product of a process that 
 
 56. Id. at 962–63. 
 57. Treviño et al., supra note 39, at 964. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 965. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Treviño et al., supra note 39, at 965–68. 
 63. Id. at 965; Maurice E. Schweitzer, Lisa Ordóñez & Bambi Douma, Goal Setting as a 
Motivator of Unethical Behavior, 47 ACAD. MGMT. J. 422, 423 (2004). 
 64. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 822. 
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occurs in a “black box” inaccessible to our understanding?  If so, the prospects 
for promoting ethical behavior, much less something as ambitious as 
constructing an ethical organization culture, seem limited. 
Work in a range of fields, however, has begun to explore more closely the 
non-conscious moral judgment process, and to provide plausible accounts of 
how it operates.65  This work has not converged on a single explanation, but it 
does offer many complementary insights.  These deal with the dynamics and 
logic of the process, its possible evolutionary significance, and its interaction 
with more self-conscious moral reasoning.  As I will suggest, from this work 
we also can make at least some preliminary observations about how to take this 
non-conscious process into account in attempting to foster an ethical 
organizational culture. 
One common way to characterize the process in which we are interested is 
as the operation of intuition.66  Intuitions seem suddenly just to appear in 
consciousness, without prior deliberation.  They represent an immediate 
judgment about a situation, which often is accompanied by a particular 
emotion.  As Jonathan Haidt describes it, a moral intuition is “the sudden 
appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative 
feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about the character or actions of a person, 
without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search, 
weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.”67  Thus, “[w]e see an act of 
violence, or hear about an act of gratitude, and we experience an instant flash 
of evaluation, which may be as hard to explain as the affective response to a 
face or a painting.”68  This immediate reaction may be followed by a search for 
reasons to justify that judgment either to oneself or to others.69  The response 
itself, however, does not involve what we conventionally regard as reasoning. 
Haidt emphasizes that distinguishing between intuition and reasoning is 
not the same as distinguishing between emotion and cognition.  “Intuition, 
reasoning, and the appraisals contained in emotions,” he maintains, “are all 
forms of cognition.”70  Intuition is the form that occurs effortlessly, “such that 
the outcome but not the process is accessible to consciousness,” while 
 
 65. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 66. Not all scholars who recognize the role of non-conscious processing in producing moral 
responses would necessarily frame such processing precisely specifically as the operation of 
intuitions—at least insofar as that formulation suggests that perception without mental operations 
serves as the immediate basis for moral judgments.  For some scholars, that characterization 
seems to neglect the “computational” role of the mind in employing structures to translate stimuli 
into judgments that incorporate moral concepts.  See, e.g., Mikhail, supra note 34, at 4 (stating 
that “a simple perceptual model, such as the one implicit in Haidt’s influential model of moral 
judgment, is inadequate for explaining” how moral intuitions arise). 
 67. Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 7 (emphasis removed). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 8. 
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reasoning “occurs more slowly, requires some effort, and involves at least 
some steps that are accessible to consciousness.”71 
Intuition collapses the four stages that I have described into one.  A person 
simultaneously: (1) perceives that a situation has ethical significance, (2) 
arrives at a judgment about right and wrong with respect to it, (3) experiences 
an emotion that motivates her to form an intention to respond in a certain way, 
and (4) is moved to behave in accordance with that intention.  The perception 
of the situation is holistic, not analytic. 
C. The Social Intuitionist Model 
Jonathan Haidt and Fredrik Bjorklund offer a “social intuitionist” model 
containing six links that purport to capture the process of non-conscious moral 
judgment.72  First is intuitive judgment, which involves a close connection 
between visceral reaction and conscious assessment.73  Some feature of the 
situation elicits an immediate response that provokes a moral judgment.74  
When, for instance, witnessing or hearing about the behavior of another, a 
“flash of feeling” first occurs.75  This tends to lead to moral judgment: 
conscious praise or blame of the behavior, including a belief in its rightness or 
wrongness.76  “These flashes of intuition are not dumb; as with the superb 
mental software that runs visual perception, they often hide a great deal of 
sophisticated processing occurring behind the scenes.”77 
Scott Reynolds has suggested a neurocognitive explanation of this 
process.78  It begins with the claim that humans rely on both conscious and 
non-conscious processing of information to make sense of their environment.79  
Intuition reflects the operation of non-conscious processing, which is 
associated with specific regions of the brain.80  Neurons receive a stimulus 
from the environment and transmit electrochemical signals that form a neural 
pattern unique to that stimulus.81  The brain then compares this pattern against 
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existing base patterns, or prototypes, which can represent “sounds, language, 
objects, scenes, situations, concepts, and even complex social interactions.”82 
Prototypes are multi-dimensional, drawing on all five senses.  The 
prototype of an object, for instance, can indicate the contexts in which that 
object is found and the sensory stimuli associated with it, while the prototype 
of a scene “could incorporate information about the season in which it occurs 
or the people who usually are involved.”83  To the extent that a pattern matches 
a prototype, the relevant stimuli are presented to consciousness in terms of that 
prototype.84  This allows individuals to recognize elements of the environment 
with minimal cognitive effort.85 
Most relevant for our purposes, prototypes can include ethically significant 
patterns.86  Ethical prototypes exist for situations such as bribery, fraud, sexual 
harassment, lying, and the like.87  These prototypes include “normative 
evaluations and prescriptive recommendations” that guide the individual’s 
response to the situation.88  “For instance, a bribery prototype not only 
describes what a prototypical bribery situation looks like, but also indicates 
that such situations are viewed by society as ethically abhorrent and that the 
ethically acceptable behavior is to deny the bribe.”89  Ethical prototypes 
therefore “are dynamic constructs holding descriptive, evaluative, and 
prescriptive information in one configuration of neural network signals.”90 
This process constitutes a rapid form of information processing that 
requires a low level of our active attention.  Only when stimuli do not match 
our available prototypes do we engage in a more active, conscious cognitive 
process.  The latter process does not just involve pattern-matching, but is 
capable of using abstract rules to arrive at judgments.  When we rely on it, we 
are aware that we are engaged in a deliberative activity that relies on tools such 
as logic and ethical theories. 
The second link in Haidt and Bjorklund’s social intuitionist model is the 
“[p]ost-[h]oc reasoning link.”91  They define reasoning as mental activity that 
involves at least two steps that are performed consciously.92  Reason 
conventionally is described as consisting of steps such as searching for relevant 
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evidence, weighing it, coordinating evidence with theories, and reaching a 
decision.93  Social intuitionist theory argues that moral reasoning typically 
occurs after a moral judgment is made and that it involves a post hoc search for 
arguments to support that judgment.94  This search does not lead to the 
judgment, in other words, but follows from it.  As Haidt suggests, when this 
occurs, 
what people are searching for is not a memory of the actual cognitive 
processes that caused their behaviors, because these processes are not 
accessible to consciousness.  Rather, people are searching for plausible 
theories about why they might have done what they did. . . . The search is 
likely to be a one-sided search of memory for supporting evidence only.95 
In some cases, it may be easy for us to articulate why we have judged behavior 
to be right or wrong.  In other cases, it may take awhile, as we search for 
reasons that seem to account for our reaction.  In still other cases, when 
pressed for an explanation of or justification for our judgment, we may not be 
able to provide a coherent one.  Haidt describes this phenomenon as being 
“morally dumbfounded”96  Even when presented with arguments for the 
opposite side in this situation, people typically will not change their initial 
position.97 
Thus, “our conscious verbal reasoning is in no way the command center of 
our actions; it is rather more like a press secretary, whose job is to offer 
convincing explanations for whatever the person happens to do.”98  This 
characterization echoes Hume’s pronouncements that “[r]eason is . . . the slave 
of the passions,”99 and that morality is “more properly felt than judg’d 
of . . . .”100 
Support for the view that we typically use reason to support our intuitive 
conclusions comes from research on motives that bias and shape reasoning.101  
The first group of motives, “relatedness motives,” shapes judgments in 
accordance with a desire for harmony and agreement with others.102  More 
specifically, we are motivated to agree with our friends and those with whom 
we expect to have some interaction.103  Haidt suggests that this makes sense 
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from an evolutionary perspective—”it would be strange if our moral judgment 
machinery was designed principally for accuracy, with no concern for the 
disastrous effects of periodically siding with our enemies and against our 
friends.”104 
A second set of motives is “[c]oherence” motives.105  These are activated 
by the desire to avoid or resolve cognitive dissonance.106  We often reason 
defensively, seeking to align beliefs and behavior in an integrated and 
consistent self-image.107  Furthermore, our desire to believe that we live in a 
world in which people get what they deserve can lead us to express moral 
judgments that confirm this belief.108 
Both types of motives move us generally to seek out evidence that supports 
our positions and commitments, and to minimize evidence that undermines 
it.109  We may depart from this tendency in limited circumstances when we 
have adequate time and reasoning ability, are motivated to be accurate, have no 
prior judgment to justify, and when no situational cues trigger relatedness or 
coherence motivations.110  Most of the time, however, we engage in post hoc 
reasoning that “is heavily marred by the biased search only for reasons that 
support one’s already-stated hypothesis.”111 
The third link in the social intuitionist model is the “[r]easoned 
[p]ersuasion” link.112  This link introduces the “social” element into the 
model.113  “People love to talk about moral questions and violations,” 
communicating their moral judgments to others in an effort to reach some 
consensus on standards of conduct.114  Such a process is adaptive because it 
enables individuals to coordinate their actions and to cooperate with others.115  
People engaged in this process are potentially amenable to persuasion by the 
arguments of others; in this respect genuine moral reasoning can occur that is 
not directed simply toward justification of pre-existing judgments.116 
This process of persuasion, however, does not necessarily operate through 
logic.  “Because moral positions always have an affective component to them,” 
Haidt argues, reasoned persuasion may work “not by providing logically 
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compelling arguments but by triggering new affectively valenced intuitions in 
the listener.”117  Thus, “If Saddam Hussein is Hitler, it follows that he must be 
stopped.  But if Iraq is Vietnam, it follows that the United States should not 
become involved.”118 
As long as a person is at least somewhat open to persuasion by another, 
there is the chance that the two may reach a better conclusion than either could 
have done on his or her own.119  While we are bad at questioning our own 
assumptions and judgments, people do this for us in moral conversation.120  
Thus, the social intuitionist model “gives moral reasoning a causal role in 
moral judgment, but only when reasoning runs through other people.”121  This 
link in the model reflects the view that “moral judgment is not just a single act 
that occurs in a single person’s mind but is an ongoing process, often spread 
out over time and over multiple people.  Reasons and arguments can circulate 
and affect people . . . .”122 
The fourth, “[s]ocial [p]ersuasion,” link reflects the ways in which the 
mere behavior of others, unaccompanied by dialogue, can influence our moral 
judgments.123  We look to others for cues to interpret the meaning of a 
situation, especially when it is ambiguous.124  As Haidt and Bjorklund describe 
the basis for this process of unconscious influence, 
Only human beings cooperate widely and intensely with non-kin, and we do it 
in part through a set of social psychological adaptations that make us 
extremely sensitive to and influenceable by what other people think and feel.  
We have an intense need to belong and to fit in . . . , and our moral judgments 
are strongly shaped by what others in our “parish” believe, even when they 
don’t give us any reasons for their beliefs.125 
“These four links form the core of the social intuitionist model.”126  That 
model posits that we typically engage in moral reasoning after our judgments 
have been formed, and that we engage in that exercise in order to justify, rather 
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than arrive at, those judgments.127  At the same time, however, moral reasoning 
between and among people can lead to new judgments, rather than simply 
confirm pre-existing ones.128  When it occurs, this process may work mainly 
by triggering intuitions in others, rather than through logical persuasion.129 
While the model regards these links as a description of the vast majority of 
moral judgments that people make, it acknowledges that people sometimes 
may change their judgments by engaging in private reasoning.130  The model 
therefore includes two additional links to capture this process, which may 
occur “somewhat rarely outside of highly specialized subcultures such as that 
of philosophy, which provides years of training in unnatural modes of human 
thought.”131 
Link five is “[r]easoned [j]udgment.”132  In this case, a person uses logic to 
override her initial intuition and arrive at a different conclusion.133  People may 
attempt, for instance, to arrive at moral judgments by reasoning from first 
principles.134  These judgments meet with great resistance, however, if they 
conflict with strong moral intuitions.135  The process of reasoned judgment 
may operate mainly when an initial intuition is weak and a person’s moral 
reasoning capabilities are high.136 
The sixth link consists of “[p]rivate [r]eflection.”137  In the course of 
deliberating on a situation, a person may trigger a new intuition that contradicts 
an original intuitive judgment.138  Role-playing can be an effective method of 
activating new intuitions; “[s]imply by putting yourself into the shoes of 
another person you may instantly feel pain, sympathy, or other vicarious 
emotional responses.”139  A person may choose which intuition to honor by 
applying a rule or principle.140  Perhaps more commonly, someone may choose 
the intuition that seems strongest and most apt; “ultimately the person decides 
on a feeling of rightness, rather than a deduction of some kind.”141 
An emerging body of research thus suggests that our default method of 
perceiving ethical issues and making ethical judgments may be non-conscious 
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information processing that generates intuitions.  Only when patterns of stimuli 
do not match our available prototypes does more deliberate self-conscious 
reasoning swing into action. 
Some scholars have recently has suggested that, in some circumstances, 
moral reasoning may play a more influential role in producing moral 
judgments than social intuitionists claim—that reasoning is not limited mostly 
to justifying judgments after they have been made.142  Joshua Greene and 
colleagues, for instance, argue for a “synthetic theory of moral judgment,” in 
which both emotional intuitions and abstract reasoning can play a role in 
different circumstances.143 This model “stand[s] in tension with the social 
intuitionist claim that in nearly all cases moral judgments are more akin to 
perception than episodes of reasoning or reflection.”144  At the same time, they 
acknowledge that a focus on the role of intuitions represents an important 
corrective to traditional conceptions of moral judgment that define it solely in 
terms of cognition untainted by emotion.145 
Cordelia Fine points to studies that indicate that in some instances, certain 
factors may disrupt the connection between intuition and judgment in people 
who tend to evaluate others on the basis of stereotypes.146  The desire to be 
accurate, some dependence on the person being judged, and the belief that 
stereotyping is unacceptable all can inhibit the activation and application of 
stereotypes.147 
Experiments indicate that resistance to stereotyping in such instances 
requires a more than minimal amount of “attentional resources,” which 
suggests the operation of controlled, effortful moral reasoning prior to the 
formation of a judgment.148  Personal motivations and values therefore may 
prompt the use of more involved deliberation that prevents or limits the 
operation of automatic responses.149 
If such factors can provide the opportunity for moral reasoning to play a 
causal role in judgments, it is possible that even intuitive reactions may 
represent the product of prior moral reasoning that has become 
“automatized.”150  Reasoning may be informed by personal aspirations or 
 
 142. Fine, supra note 38; David A. Pizarro & Paul Bloom, The Intelligence of Moral 
Intuitions: Comment on Haidt, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 193 (2003). 
 143. Joshua D. Greene et al., The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral 
Judgment, 44 NEURON 389, 397 (2004). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 389, 396–97. 
 146. Fine, supra note 38.  For an account of the way in which such stereotyping can occur 
rapidly and non-consciously, see Dolly Chugh, Societal and Managerial Implications of Implicit 
Social Cognition: Why Milliseconds Matter, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 203 (2004). 
 147. Fine, supra note 38, at 87. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. 
 150. Id. at 95. 
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commitments to certain values that motivate someone to make the cognitive 
effort required to resist the influence of automatic non-conscious reactions.151  
To the extent that judgment and behavior is habitually shaped by these 
aspirations or commitments, they may eventually become sufficiently durable 
that they are triggered by the non-conscious processing that generates 
intuitions. 
This account seems plausible.  Think, for instance, of sexual harassment in 
the workplace.  A generation ago, certain behaviors of men toward women that 
we now think of as offensive were regarded by many as unexceptional and 
perhaps inevitable.  Such behavior triggered little awareness of harm, and 
minimal moral disapproval.  In the intervening years, however, there has been 
a self-conscious effort to illuminate the injuries both to psyche and career that 
women can suffer because of certain sexually-charged behavior.  We may now 
be moving toward a point when such behavior triggers an immediate reaction 
of disapproval and disgust.  In other words, we may be approaching the point 
at which certain conduct elicits distinct moral intuitions.  Those intuitions 
simultaneously shape our perception—we now “see” sexual harassment where 
we did not before—as well as our evaluation of what we perceive. 
In this way, the campaign to raise awareness of the various behavioral 
forms that sexual harassment can take may reflect the generation of a new 
moral prototype.  It began with an effort at reasoned persuasion.  That effort 
undoubtedly sought to trigger existing intuitions.  It also, however, appealed at 
least in part to the conscious and deliberate information processing system that 
relies on logic and principles, such as the notion of equality.  There followed a 
stage in which people whose consciousness was evolving on the issue 
deliberately and self-consciously began to categorize certain behavior as 
harassment.  This would involve, for instance, the disruption of otherwise 
automatic tolerant reactions to such behavior.  The most durable foundation for 
behavior change, however, will come when people automatically characterize 
conduct as harassment without an intervening self-conscious step. 
If this story is right, it suggests that intuitions are not necessarily 
irreducible intractable phenomena, but may be amenable to deliberate revision 
and construction in some cases.  Fine suggests that this may occur when “the 
individual is motivated to form accurate judgments, and has the attentional 
resources available to do so.”152  We can accept this amendment to the social 
intuitionist model while still acknowledging that moral judgments may be the 
product of automatic intuitions far more than most people realize.153 
 
 151. Id. at 94–95. 
 152. Fine, supra note 38, at 97. 
 153. Indeed, Haidt would agree with Fine to a certain extent: “The reasoning process in moral 
judgment may be capable of working objectively under very limited circumstances: when the 
person has adequate time and processing capacity, a motivation to be accurate, no a priori 
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In sum, research indicates that, despite their non-conscious origins, we 
need not regard moral intuitions as beyond our understanding or influence.  
The reasoned persuasion link of Haidt’s social intuitionist model provides a 
role for dialogue in subjecting intuitions to scrutiny and leaving us open to the 
possibility of changing our moral judgments.  He believes that such dialogue is 
most likely to have this effect when one person is able to trigger alternative 
intuitions in another, but he also acknowledges the possibility that appeals to 
logic may be influential in some cases.154 
Furthermore, Fine suggests that intuitions themselves may be the product 
of previous conscious processes that relied on deliberate reasoning, whose 
outcomes eventually are expressed in automatic reactions.155  People may be 
motivated to engage in such reasoning rather than be guided by intuitions if 
they aspire to moral responses that are more consistent with the values to 
which they subscribe.156  Other motivations also may make people willing to 
activate a conscious process of moral judgment.157  If a person has the 
opportunity to muster the cognitive resources to engage in this activity, her 
moral responses will result from deliberate moral reasoning. 
What are the implications of this model for organizational culture?  As 
Treviño, Weaver, and Reynolds suggest, “[I]t seems unlikely that moral 
intuitions specifically about some of the ethical issues that occur in complex 
organizations are all, or entirely, formed during early periods of life.  Thus, 
researchers might ask whether and how the social context of organizational life 
influences moral intuition.”158  What, if any, link might there be between the 
operation of moral intuitions and the behavior of people within organizations? 
There has been little sustained attention to this question thus far.  Treviño, 
Weaver, and Reynolds, for instance, opine that it would be useful to explore 
whether “social learning processes (e.g., behavior modeling by others at work), 
or successful opportunities for moral behavior, build up a repertoire of 
affectively supported moral intuitions[.]”159  Reynolds suggests that in some 
cases, managers may have “deeply engrained prototypes” about moral 
dilemmas that do not reflect what the organization regards as appropriate.160  In 
these instances, he argues, organizations may want to use role-playing and 
small group discussions to “draw [prototypes] out of nonconscious processing” 
 
judgment to defend or justify, and when no relatedness or coherence motivations are triggered.”  
Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 34, at 822. 
 154. Haidt & Bjorklund, supra note 34, at 10–12. 
 155. Fine, supra note 38, at 86–87. 
 156. Id. at 87. 
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 158. Treviño et al., supra note 39, at 961. 
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 160. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 745. 
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so that they can be critically evaluated.161  In addition, organizations will need 
to provide new prototypes for newly emerging ethical situations, and expose 
managers to them regularly.162  Finally, organizations should make available 
general rules or guidelines that can guide managers’ decision-making when 
they rely on more conscious deliberative reasoning.163 
In the next section, I will suggest how the work on moral intuitions might 
inform efforts to promote an ethical culture within an organization.  I will not 
offer specific programs or techniques; my focus instead will be on the general 
form that such efforts might take. 
II.  THE ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING 
A. The Power of Prototypes 
Several features of modern organizational life that seem relevant to the 
work on moral intuitions are the accelerating pace and scope of business 
operations, the frequency with which people confront novel situations, and the 
need for rapid decision-making.  As Scott Sonenshein observes, “Several 
accounts portray managerial work as one in which quick reactions are needed, 
and where managers use experience, such as pattern-matching to a pre-existing 
category.”164  This suggests that it may be difficult regularly to make available 
the amount of attentional resources necessary to use deliberate reasoning to 
shape judgment and behavior.  The mental process instead resembles non-
conscious neurocognitive operations in which a person compares patterns of 
stimuli with pre-existing prototypes and activates conscious processes only 
when there is no match between them.  This “[l]ow effort cognitive 
system[]”165 seems suited for dealing with the barrage of stimuli that managers 
receive. 
Scott Reynolds underscores that “[t]he business environment changes 
quickly, and managers often operate in new contexts where norms have yet to 
be established and therefore prototypes are scarce.”166  He suggests, however, 
that the result is that managers need regularly to “rely on their higher order 
conscious reasoning skills.”167  This seems right insofar as it recognizes that 
managers may not have moral prototypes readily accessible in novel situations, 
and that inducing moral responses in such situations requires stimulating 
deliberate moral reasoning. 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Sonenshein, supra note 17, at 23 (citations omitted). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 745; see also Chugh, supra note 146. 
 167. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 745. 
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Managers are likely, however, to have non-moral prototypes available for 
use in these situations that emphasize practical business considerations.  
Research indicates that the default perceptual framework that people use in the 
work setting is less likely to include moral concerns than the one that they use 
outside of work.168  Other research indicates that experienced managers are 
less likely to frame a situation in moral terms than are less experienced ones.169  
The reason is that “experienced business practitioners are more likely to 
possess well-developed business-schemas and therefore to be primed by their 
environment to pay attention to the strategic, rather than the moral, 
components of the environment.”170  Thus, absent the kind of disruption of the 
link between intuitions and judgments that Fine describes,171 managers may 
often fail to perceive the moral dimensions of novel situations in which they 
need to make rapid decisions.  Their intuitive responses, in other words, may 
contain no moral component, because the prototypes that are the foundation of 
these intuitions fail to do so. 
The decreasing amount of attentional resources that seem to be available to 
managers suggests that triggering new intuitions may be a more promising way 
to increase moral awareness than attempting to activate conscious moral 
reasoning.  While both may be necessary, the first may be more important.  If 
this is right, it directs attention to the prototypes that are crucial in generating 
intuitions.172  How and why do prototypes come into existence?  More 
specifically for our purposes, what kinds of opportunities might there be to 
prompt reliance on moral prototypes in the modern organizational setting?  As 
Reynolds argues, “The more the organization can infuse managers with 
prototypes of ethical behavior, the more reflexive pattern matching will 
override the system and automatically lead to ethical outcomes.”173 
Reynolds describes moral prototypes as “initially defined by the five 
senses with information about the observable qualities of the situation,” but as 
distinguished from other prototypes in that they include “normative evaluations 
and prescriptive recommendations.”174  Moral prototypes thus seem to be 
mental representations of common scenarios that have moral significance, 
 
 168. See, e.g., Jeremy I. M. Carpendale & Dennis L. Krebs, Situational Variation in Moral 
Judgment: In a Stage or On a Stage?, 21 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 203 (1992). 
 169. See Jennifer Jordan, Business Experience and Moral Awareness: When Less May Be 
More 38 (Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth, Social Science Research Network, Working 
Paper No. 26, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=845827. 
 170. Id. at 14; see also Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of 
Missed Opportunities, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 379 (1992). 
 171. See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text. 
 172. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 742.  “Prototypes are the central component of the reflexive 
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 173. Id. at 745. 
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which require that we make distinctive kinds of judgments.  One way to gain 
insight into their operation therefore is to ask, “Why do people make any kind 
of moral judgment?”175  The literature that responds to this question is, of 
course, vast, and I am in no position to offer anything close to an overall 
assessment of it.  Instead, I want to describe one school of thought that is 
consistent with the intuitionist model, which may help identify prototypes 
especially relevant to the organizational environment. 
B. Morality and Cooperation 
A “pragmatic” approach to moral judgment focuses on the functions and 
purposes that morality serves for human beings.176  It urges us to “view moral 
judgments and moral behaviors not as end products of moral reasoning, but, 
rather, as means to ends, as tools that people use to accomplish tasks and 
achieve results.”177  In particular, what kind of evolutionary advantage might 
accrue to beings who engage in moral evaluation?  How is morality an 
adaptive activity in the process of human evolution? 
A common answer to these questions that seems especially relevant to the 
organizational setting is that moral judgments help to promote and reinforce 
the cooperative behavior necessary for humans to survive and flourish.178  As 
Matt Ridley has suggested: 
We are, misanthropes notwithstanding, unable to live without each other.  
Even on a practical level, it is probably a million years since any human being 
was entirely and convincingly self-sufficient: able to survive without trading 
 
 175. Dennis L. Krebs & Kathy Denton, Toward a More Pragmatic Approach to Morality: A 
Critical Evaluation of Kohlberg’s Model, 112 PSYCHOL. REV. 629 (2005); see also Dennis L. 
Krebs et al., The Forms and Functions of Real-Life Moral Decision-Making, 26 J. MORAL EDUC. 
131 (1997). 
 176. Krebs & Denton, supra note 175, at 639. 
 177. Id. at 639. 
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his skills for those of his fellow humans.  We are far more dependent on other 
members of our species than any other ape or monkey.179 
Similarly, Adam Smith noted, “In almost every other race of animals each 
individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its 
natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature.  But 
man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren . . . .”180 
This set of conditions tends to favor those with dispositions to cooperate 
and to uphold cooperative arrangements.  As Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin 
maintain: 
Throughout our recent evolutionary history . . . there must have been extreme 
selective pressures in favor of our ability to cooperate as a group . . . . The 
degree of selective pressure toward cooperation . . . was so strong, and the 
period over which it operated so extended . . . that it can hardly have failed to 
become embedded to some degree in our genetic makeup.181 
Certain emotional responses reflect this evolved disposition.  These emotions 
express moral judgments that people use “to induce themselves and others to 
cooperate and resist the temptation to cheat.”182  Joshua Greene suggests that 
our tendency to engage in rapid moral evaluations may reflect the influence of 
evolution: “We have evolved mechanisms for making quick, emotion-based 
social judgments,” he says, “for ‘seeing’ rightness and wrongness, because our 
intensely social lives favour such capacities.”183 
Every system of cooperation is vulnerable to exploitation by those who 
participate in it.  Individuals may capitalize on others’ long-term commitments 
and on delayed or indirect forms of exchange to take more than their share of 
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benefits without reciprocating.  Moral norms arise in order to minimize this 
danger, thereby preserving the viability of cooperation as an adaptive strategy.  
Feelings of reciprocity, gratitude, sympathy, obligation, and admiration can 
reinforce cooperative bonds, while feelings of indignation, guilt, and injustice 
can serve as mechanisms to detect and punish selfish exploitation of 
cooperative ties.  These may move us not simply to cooperate, but to attempt to 
induce others to do so, and to sanction those who do not.  Moral norms and the 
emotions they evoke thus seek to ensure that “morality and emotional habits 
pay,” by fostering a value system in which “[t]he more you behave in selfless 
and generous ways the more you can reap the benefits of cooperative endeavor 
from society.  You get more from life if you irrationally forgo opportunism.”184 
On this view, moral judgment is activated by issues involving “social 
exchange, giving and taking, rights and duties, conflicts of interest, and 
violations of the principles and rules that uphold cooperative relations.”185  
Krebs and Denton maintain that the occasions on which this occurs involve 
certain characteristic dilemmas.  People confront “temptation dilemmas” when 
they are tempted to pursue their own interests at the expense of others, and 
“social pressure dilemmas” when they attempt to persuade others to behave in 
ways that help them achieve their goals.186  They face dilemmas involving 
conflicting demands and the needs of others when they must decide what they 
owe others and what they can claim for themselves.187  Finally, they must deal 
with “transgression dilemmas” when they decide whether to use moral 
judgments to impose sanctions against those who violate moral norms.188 
Conceptualizing moral judgment in this way implies that “different social 
contexts are guided by different systems of cooperation, moral orders, or forms 
of sociality, . . . which are upheld by different types of moral judgment.”189  
Cooperative arrangements vary in the immediacy of the personal relationships 
that they contain.  Some involve hierarchical relationships of obedience to 
those in “higher” positions, coupled with a right to receive their care; some 
feature literal exchange; still others represent systems of reciprocity based on 
gratitude and mutual expectations.190  Increasing in abstraction, the social order 
itself can be seen as a cooperative arrangement maintained by a sense of 
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mutual obligation, and ultimately by the agreement of free and equal 
individuals. 
These social structures correspond to the stages of moral reasoning that 
Kohlberg argued reflect gradually increasing moral maturity.191  In his 
formulation, one stage displaces another as a person matures.192  Krebs and 
Denton argue, however, that society contains a mixture of different forms of 
cooperation, and that each form of reasoning is appropriate to a particular 
form.193  As people mature, they ideally acquire a more comprehensive 
understanding of the ties that underlie all forms of cooperation in their 
societies.194  This allows them to appreciate increasingly more remote and 
abstract structures of cooperation.195 
The ability to draw on this understanding when engaged in moral 
reasoning, however, does not mean this reasoning style replaces all others.  
Rather, people retain the flexibility to invoke the type of moral judgments 
appropriate to the cooperative arrangement in question.196 Cooperation based 
on a hierarchical structure of paternalism, for instance, may properly elicit 
moral evaluations that rely on notions of obedience, vulnerability, and care, 
while cooperation resting on a specialized division of labor may prompt moral 
judgments invoking norms that speak to contribution, reliance, and 
opportunism. 
This account of moral judgments suggests that moral prototypes are 
especially likely to emerge in contexts in which our ability to cooperate is at 
issue. Highlighting the effect of certain behavior on possibilities for 
cooperation thus may be an important step in both triggering existing 
prototypes and generating new ones.  Even if fostering cooperation is but one 
of the functions of moral judgments, it is a function that may have particular 
relevance in the organizational setting. 
An organization, of course, is one example of a cooperative human 
enterprise.  It therefore is a setting in which people are engaged in efforts to 
coordinate their actions with others in order to achieve together what no 
individual could alone.  This means that members of organizations must decide 
how much to forgo immediate personal advantage for the sake of the larger 
group, the extent to which they are willing to make contributions that are not 
immediately reciprocated, whether other people should be sanctioned for 
exploiting cooperation for selfish gain, and myriad other questions that raise 
issues of trust, commitment, altruism, selfishness, opportunism, loyalty, 
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betrayal, and sacrifice that we think of as moral.  An organization thus would 
seem to be an important arena for the elicitation of moral prototypes. 
Consider once again my example of the potential emergence of a prototype 
of sexual harassment in the workplace.  Over the past generation, increasing 
numbers of women have entered the paid labor force.  As they have come to 
participate more in organizational forms of cooperation, it has become clearer 
that certain behaviors of men toward women that have been unreflectively 
accepted jeopardize the ability to work cooperatively together.  This behavior 
increasingly elicits moral condemnation.  That is not to say that these 
condemnations rest purely on functional grounds, as opposed to recognition of 
the equal dignity of women and men.  The occasion for vindicating equal 
dignity in this setting, however, may have arisen as a result of how this form of 
cooperation has evolved. 
C. Triggering Intuitions: Legal Compliance Programs 
What might all this mean for the role of moral intuition in promoting 
ethical behavior and fostering an ethical culture within organizations?  It 
suggests that people in organizations may be especially receptive to appeals 
that animate dispositions to build and sustain cooperative relationships.  I want 
first to discuss how prompting these dispositions may elicit intuitions that we 
think of as morally salutary.  When this occurs, members of an organization 
may respond with altruism, sacrifice, and self-restraint that enhances group 
solidarity and commitment.  At the same time, there is a risk that a strong sense 
of group identity will trigger other intuitions that make members more willing 
to ignore or even disadvantage those who are not members of the group.  I 
therefore will discuss how an organization might try to minimize the influence 
of these intuitions.  From this perspective, the challenge for an organization is 
how selectively to elicit and inhibit distinct sets of moral intuitions. 
Focusing first on desirable intuitions, these are more likely to come into 
play the more people regard the organization as a cooperative venture and are 
sensitive to how different behavior is likely to sustain or jeopardize it.  The 
challenge in a large organization is that the consequences and nature of much 
behavior can seem remote from the vivid, perhaps primal, scenarios that 
inform the moral prototypes associated with cooperative relationships.  
Organizations therefore need to give considerable thought to what kinds of 
policies and practice can serve as the kind of “custom complexes”197 that both 
trigger appropriate moral intuitions and generate new ones. 
Research on the relative effectiveness of different types of legal 
compliance programs suggests one way in which an organization can highlight 
its character as a cooperative enterprise, and thus potentially activate moral 
prototypes.  This work distinguishes between programs based solely on 
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promulgation and enforcement of rules and those that include what has been 
described as a values-based component.198  These orientations are not mutually 
exclusive, and organizations may differ in the extent to which they emphasize 
one or the other.199  They are, however, associated with somewhat different 
motivations and behaviors.200 
A program that focuses on compliance with rules, and on imposing 
penalties for violating them, tends to emphasize deterrence.201  It sets forth 
fairly specific prescriptions designed to minimize discretion and regularize 
behavior.202  The program puts in place monitoring and audit systems to 
prevent, detect, report, and punish improper behavior.203 
What is called a “values-oriented” component of a compliance program 
has a broader focus.204  It emphasizes the values to which the organization is 
committed, encouraging employees to identify with and act on the basis of 
those values.205  While there are penalties for acting inconsistently with the 
values, the organization assumes that people aspire to behave consistently with 
them and emphasizes that they necessarily will have to exercise some 
discretion in deciding how to do so.206 
Research has measured the impact of deterrence-oriented and values-
oriented features of a compliance program on different types of ethically 
significant behavior.  Deterrence-oriented features have a positive relationship 
to: (1) lower observed unethical conduct by others, (2) willingness to seek 
ethical advice, (3) awareness of ethical issues, and (4) perception of better 
decision-making.207  Values-oriented features have an even greater positive 
relationship to these outcomes.  They also have a positive relationship with 
additional outcomes that deterrence features do not: (1) commitment to the 
organization, (2) feeling of integrity in that values and behavior at work 
consistent with those outside of work, and (3) willingness to deliver bad 
news.208  Finally, neither kind of orientation alone has a positive effect on the 
willingness to report unethical behavior, but employees more likely to report 
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such behavior if they perceived a combined values- and deterrence-based 
orientation.209   
A perceived values orientation thus “appears to add distinctive and 
desirable outcomes that are not achieved by a focus on behavioral 
compliance.”210  A compliance system that has only deterrence features can 
produce ethical behavior, but its impact will be stronger if it accompanied by 
values-based features.  A clue to why this is so is the fact that values-based 
features are correlated with commitment to the organization and a sense of 
individual integrity, while deterrence-based features are not.211  This suggests 
that values and deterrence orientations tap into different types of motivation for 
compliance.212 
A values orientation prompts ethical behavior because the individual 
identifies with the organization’s commitment to ethics and sees it as valuable 
for its own sake.213  Ethical behavior in organizations with this orientation 
reflects people’s sense that the organization’s values are consistent with their 
own.214  Another way to describe this is that the employee sees herself as part 
of a cooperative venture that is attempting to serve purposes with which she 
identifies.  A values-based orientation sends a “message of trust and 
support,”215 which enhances willingness to contribute to this collective 
enterprise.  This identification with and support for the organization as a 
cooperative arrangement is an especially durable motivation for ethical 
behavior. 
By contrast, a deterrence program prompts ethical behavior because a 
person follows rules to avoid sanctions.216  A program that emphasizes rule-
following provides only minimal support for regarding the organization as a 
scheme of cooperation.217  The organization is more likely to be perceived as 
an external force that seeks to impose regulations on behavior because 
cooperation is scarce.218 
The relative emphasis on different features of a legal compliance program 
thus may underscore or minimize the character of an organization as a scheme 
of cooperation, thereby eliciting or inhibiting moral prototypes associated with 
cooperative activity.  The greater ethical behavior prompted by values-based 
program features may reflect the role of these prototypes in triggering moral 
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intuitions.  When an individual identifies with an organization, she sees it as a 
vehicle for realizing personal values through cooperation with others.219  As a 
result, she will be more attentive to the ways in which her behavior may 
support or undermine this cooperative venture.220  By contrast, a compliance 
program based solely on deterrence may implicitly send the message that the 
pursuit of self-interest is the dominant behavior within the organization.221  
This means that the program is unlikely to trigger the type of prototypes and 
intuitions that provide an especially durable basis for ethical behavior. 
There is some support for this “signaling” effect of compliance programs 
from experiments by Ann Tenbrunsel and David Messick that measure the 
effect of differing levels of sanctions on willingness to cooperate in 
organizational contexts.222  When sanctions are strong, people are more likely 
to cooperate than when sanctions are weak.223  When there are no sanctions at 
all, however, people are also more likely to cooperate than when sanctions are 
weak.224 
Why should there be there be less cooperation with weak sanctions than 
with no sanctions at all?  Tensbrunsel and Messick suggest that the presence of 
sanctions—that is, deterrence features—can incline people to use what they 
call a business frame.225  People who use this frame decide how to behave in a 
situation based on a pragmatic calculation of costs and benefits.226  This 
contrasts with the use of an ethical frame, in which people generally do not 
engage in such calculation.227  Instead, they tend to make judgments about 
inherent rightness or wrongness when deciding what to do.228  One might say, 
in other words, that each frame elicits a distinct set of prototypes that guide 
judgment and behavior.229  “[A] weak sanctioning system,” they conclude, 
“prompts a perception that the decision concerns the costs versus the benefits 
of cooperating, whereas the lack of such a system prompts relatively more 
consideration of the ethical aspects of the decision.”230 
Thus, when the presence of sanctions triggers a business frame, and 
sanctions are strong, an individual will behave ethically because a cost-benefit 
analysis indicates that is the best thing to do.  When the presence of sanctions 
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triggers a business frame, and sanctions are weak, there is a greater chance that 
an individual will behave unethically, because a cost-benefit analysis is more 
likely to indicate that is the best course of action.  If sanctions are not 
mentioned, at least some people who are asked to respond to cooperative 
dilemmas will use an ethical frame.  Their behavior is not affected by a cost-
benefit analysis, which means that their motivation is different from someone 
who uses a business frame.  As Tenbrunsel and Messick conclude: 
the relationship between sanctioning systems and cooperation rates can be 
explained by the decision frame that is adopted. . . . [T]his finding indicates 
that the sanctioning system acts as a situational cue that triggers an assessment 
of the type of decision that one is making (i.e., ethical or business), which in 
turn influences cooperation rates.  Thus, the sanctioning system influences the 
frame, but it is the frame that determines the behavior.231 
An account of moral prototypes as animated by concerns related to 
cooperation seems consistent with this dynamic.  A business frame appears not 
to activate such prototypes because it depicts the situation as a competitive one 
in which concern for individual payoffs should be the dominant strategy.232  
Cooperation will be contingent and unstable, depending on whether it is “the 
more profitable business strategy” in a given instance.233  An ethical frame, on 
the other hand, seems to lead an individual to construct the situation as one 
marked by cooperation, thereby triggering moral prototypes and intuitions that 
support the notion that cooperation “is the ethical action to take.”234  For this 
reason, cooperation is the dominant strategy.235 
Virtually any program, of course, needs to have sanctions available to 
penalize wrongdoers.  If the dominant thrust of the program is values-based, 
however, those sanctions need not prompt the use of a business frame.  Rather, 
sanctions are likely to be regarded as a means of reinforcing a cooperative 
scheme by ensuring that individuals do not exploit the willingness of others to 
cooperate.  As Treviño and Weaver observe: 
The values orientation may frame the way employees understand the purpose 
of compliance activities.  When a values orientation is strong, compliance 
activities can be perceived as part of an overall system of support for ethical 
behavior.  Without a strong values orientation, however, compliance activities 
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might be perceived to be part of a system aimed only at detecting 
misconduct.236 
D. Triggering Intuitions: Procedural Justice 
A crucial element of any effort to promote a cooperative values-based 
culture is members’ belief that the organization treats them fairly.  The work of 
Tom Tyler and his colleagues indicates that people are more likely to commit 
to an organization if they perceive it as embodying procedural justice.237  
Factors contributing to this perception include whether procedures permit 
members to participate in decision-making processes, whether they require that 
objective information be used in those processes, and whether there are efforts 
to minimize bias.238  Even if individuals do not always obtain what they want 
from the organization, they will maintain allegiance to it if they believe that 
decisions are made through a fair process.239  This allegiance in turn can 
motivate ethical behavior.240  As a result, “an organizational environment 
characterized by fair procedures will activate strong employee organizational 
identification, thus leading employees to engage in desirable workplace 
behaviors and to hold positive attitudes towards their work organizations.”241 
Specifically, Tyler argues that the perception of procedural justice is likely 
to trigger ethical behavior based on a “self-regulatory” rather than “command 
and control” model.242  These models roughly correspond to values-based and 
deterrence-based approaches to compliance.243  The command-and-control 
model “links employees’ motivation to follow rules to the manipulation of 
sanctions in the work place,” and is “based on the view that people follow rules 
as a function of the costs and benefits they associate with doing so.”244  By 
contrast, a self-regulatory model “is based on the activation of internal 
motivations.”245  It “emphasizes the role that employees’ ethical values play in 
motivating rule following and, in particular, those ethical values that are 
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related to—and developed in the course of their interactions with—their work 
organization.”246 
Tyler’s research concludes that a self-regulatory approach is more effective 
in promoting ethical behavior because “employees take on the responsibility to 
follow rules and undertake this responsibility without being concerned with the 
likelihood of being caught and punished for wrongdoing.”247  They identify 
with the organization, and are motivated to follow its policies, because they see 
those policies as furthering values that are consistent with their own.248  “By 
activating employees’ own ethical values,” Tyler maintains, “companies can 
gain willing cooperation from their employees.  By having people regulate 
themselves, such willing cooperation becomes much more efficient and 
effective.”249 
This description of the role that fair procedures play in animating 
identification with an organization and voluntary compliance with its policies 
is consistent with the idea that moral intuitions are elicited by issues related to 
cooperation.  Tyler and Blader’s “group engagement” model posits that groups 
play an important role in helping individuals construct an identity and sense of 
worth.250  “The central reason that people engage themselves in groups,” they 
argue, “is because they use the feedback they receive from those groups to 
create and maintain their identities.”251  Such feedback includes information on 
both the social status of the group, which can engender a sense of pride, and 
the status of the individual within it, which can communicate a feeling of being 
respected.  When people receive information from the group that generates 
feelings of pride and respect, they are motivated to merge their sense of self 
with that of the group. 
Tyler and Blader maintain that information about procedural fairness 
within an organization is the most relevant information available to people in 
determining whether to identify with the organization.252  They argue that 
procedural justice provides a sense of “identity security” for the individual.253  
While identifying with an organization can be rewarding, it also carries risks.  
Hostile, uncooperative, or even indifferent behavior toward an individual by 
others in the organization can damage her sense of self-worth.  Anyone who 
cooperates with others is vulnerable to exploitation by them.  Individuals 
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therefore must “balance the potential identity gains associated with merging 
their identities with a group against the potential risks of that same merger of 
the self and the group.”254 
To the degree that people believe that the group follows fair procedures in 
making decisions, they are more likely to feel that they can safely merger their 
identity with the group.255  Two components of procedural justice help provide 
this reassurance.  First, fair decision-making processes indicate that decisions 
will be made by a neutral decision-maker who will consistently apply objective 
rules, rather than act on the basis of prejudice, stereotypes, or self-interest.256  
Second, treating people with dignity and politeness, taking into account their 
needs and concerns, communicates that the organization values the individuals 
who comprise it.257  This provides assurance that people “will receive 
treatment that affirms their status well into the future of their group 
membership.”258 
Another way to describe this is that an organization characterized by 
procedural justice signals to its members that the organization can be a safe 
vehicle for gaining the benefits of cooperation with others.  If members 
identify with the organization and see themselves as participants in a 
cooperative enterprise, they should be particularly sensitive to how different 
types of behavior can reinforce or undermine cooperation.  Situations in which 
behavior potentially has this effect should be especially likely to elicit moral 
prototypes and trigger moral intuitions. 
The behavior most immediately salient to this process likely will be 
behavior toward the organization itself.  Thus, in an organization with which 
members identify, we would expect a relatively low incidence of, for instance, 
diversion of organizational resources for personal gain, as occurred in 
companies like Tyco and Adelphia.  If an individual is primed to recognize the 
implications of behavior for the success of cooperation, it takes minimal 
imagination to appreciate that stealing from a cooperative venture weakens that 
venture’s viability. 
Sensitivity to the impact of her actions on the organization may also 
prompt an employee to develop a more expansive sense of responsibility for 
behavior that affects parties outside the organization.  Behavior that harms 
stakeholders can also injure the organization, as a result of legal penalties, 
public criticism, consumer boycotts, and the like.  This can threaten the success 
of the scheme of cooperation that the entity represents.  The desire to avoid 
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letting down other participants in this scheme may provide motivation for 
taking the interests of stakeholders into account. 
This is not to say that appeals to be sensitive to stakeholder interests should 
focus only on this rationale, eschewing efforts to cultivate a wider sense of 
civic responsibility.  Those efforts also can rely on appeals to interdependence, 
and on the idea of society as an even larger cooperative effort that can be 
unraveled by certain behavior.  The more immediate and palpable experience 
of life within the organization, however, may make organizational 
identification an especially powerful force in motivating responsible social 
behavior.  People generally tend to respond more sympathetically in situations 
in which they think of moral demands as more immediate and personal than 
those in which they regard such demands as remote and impersonal.259  The 
former appear to trigger more intensive emotional reactions than the latter.260  
Engagement in more deliberate moral reasoning may counteract this tendency, 
but it seems to be a powerful one that we need to take into account.261  Perhaps 
we can capitalize on it to promote more pro-social behavior based on concern 
for the organization, while using this as an intermediate toward inculcating a 
more expansive conception of social interdependence. 
The importance of procedural justice thus suggests that if an organization 
wants to foster a culture in which people act socially responsible and in ethical 
ways, one place to start may be to establish and sustain procedural justice 
within the organization.262  “To most employees, ethics means how the 
organization treats them and their coworkers.”263  When members or 
employees think of “ethics,” their initial focus is not necessarily on conduct 
covered by a company’s ethics or legal compliance program.264  Rather, it is 
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how people within the organization in positions of authority model ethical 
behavior in dealing with employees and subordinates.265 
This experience of ethics is especially vivid, and thus has potential to 
prompt reliance on moral prototypes and intuitions.  An organization that is 
perceived as treating people fairly within it can acquire the status of a 
cooperative venture with which people identify.  Because of the connection 
between moral judgments and cooperation, an organization that acquires this 
status may enhance the likelihood that people will respond to many situations 
with ethical implications on the basis of automatic moral intuitions.  Such 
intuitions help can help promote the self-regulation that Tyler describes as the 
most effective foundation for legal compliance and ethical behavior. 
E. Triggering Intuitions: Challenges 
We need to recognize that modern organizations attempting to trigger 
constructive moral intuitions may face significant obstacles.  Both increasing 
scale and changing work relationships may limit the ability of an organization 
to induce members to identify with it as participants in a cooperative scheme. 
As organizations become larger and more far-flung, they become more 
abstract to their members.  An individual’s locus of attachments may well not 
be the organization as a whole, but her division, work group, or project team.  
These multiple and potentially conflicting loyalties throughout the organization 
can constitute a vivid set of relationships that compete for allegiance with the 
larger entity.266 
The research on procedural justice reflects some sensitivity to this 
phenomenon.  It suggests that employees’ daily experiences with matters such 
as compensation, promotion, assignments, and time off all contribute to a 
perception of the organization as a whole.  Similarly, research indicates that, 
for employees, dealings with supervisors effectively are interactions with the 
organization.  As Treviño and Weaver note, “When it comes to ethics, leaders 
are leaders, and the level (supervisory or executive) does not seem to matter 
much to employees.  If a middle manager puts pressure on subordinates, 
employees are likely to infer that the pressure is coming from the top.”267  
Since all these experiences are occasions for strengthening or weakening a 
member’s allegiance to an organization, any institutional initiatives will have 
to be embedded in daily operations, and members of management at all levels 
will have to speak in a consistent voice.  The larger the organization, of course, 
the more challenging it will be to carry this out. 
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The changing nature of the relationship between employer and employee 
also may limit the ability of an organization to inspire allegiance and 
identification.  As Katherine Stone has observed: 
No longer is employment centered on a single, primary employer.  Instead, 
employees now expect to change jobs frequently.  No longer does an employee 
derive identity from a formal employment relationship with a single firm; 
rather employment identity comes from attachment to an occupation, a skills 
cluster, or an industry.  At the same time, firms now expect a regular amount 
of churning in their workplaces.  They encourage employees to look upon their 
jobs differently, to manage their own careers, and not to expect career-long job 
security.268 
Scholars have examined the extent to which the emergence of these 
conditions has given rise to a new “psychological contract” that reflects 
employees’ expectations for and perceptions of their work.269  Some suggest 
that under this contract, an employee no longer assumes that employment 
offers opportunity to advance within the organization’s internal labor market, 
but that it “offers job opportunities with other employers and marketability in 
the external labor market.”270  In other words, an individual may regard her 
relationship with an organization as more of a bargain between self-interested 
parties, and less of an opportunity for her to participate in a mutual long-term 
cooperative venture in which she identifies with the values of the entity.  
Surveying the scholarship on this issue is beyond the scope of this article, but it 
is clear that we will need to analyze carefully how changing expectations in the 
employment relationship might affect efforts to promote identification with an 
organization as a scheme of cooperation. 
Finally, even if an organization is successful in eliciting intuitions that 
promote strong organizational solidarity, the very success of that project may 
pose risks.  Such solidarity can prompt altruisim and other-regarding behavior 
for the benefit of other group members—but lead people to favor the group 
over “outsiders” such as customers, suppliers, and the larger community.  
Strong bonds of organizational cooperation, in other words, can be a double-
edged sword.  I discuss this risk in the next section.  My treatment will not be 
as extensive as my discussion of morally positive intuitions, but I want to 
identify this issue as one that requires serious attention.  At a minimum, it 
should disabuse us of any notion that fostering organizational cooperation and 
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solidarity will provide a straightforward method of promoting prosocial 
behavior. 
F. Inhibiting Intuitions 
Promoting attitudes and behavior that enhance cooperation within an 
organization may not necessarily benefit parties outside it. Cooter and 
Eisenberg underscore this with their distinction between “agent character” and 
“general character” in the business firm.271  Companies that develop “firm-
specific fairness norms”272 that their agents internalize can promote efficiency 
by fostering cooperation within the firm.  The goal is for employees to develop 
good agent character, which they define as “the disposition of an agent of a 
firm to adhere to the firm’s normative standards, reflexively or on the basis of 
commitment even when against interest.”273  In such a firm, we would expect a 
relatively low incidence of, for instance, diversion of organizational resources 
for personal gain, as occurred in companies like Tyco and Adelphia.  An 
employee with good agent character is primed to recognize the implications of 
her behavior for the success of the firm.  She will, in other words, readily 
appreciate that stealing from a cooperative venture weakens that venture’s 
viability. 
By contrast, good general character is the disposition to adhere to society’s 
normative standards.274  Cooter and Eisenberg suggest that “almost every firm 
benefits from its agents dealing fairly with itself and one another, although the 
actual content of fairness norms differs among firms.”275  Evolutionary forces 
acting through market competition should reward and select for good agent 
character and firms in which a critical mass of its employees possess it.  Those 
forces will not, however, necessarily, favor firms that promote good general 
character.  Firm survival depends on relative firm profitability, and firms may 
be profitable by dealing with outsiders in various ways.  “Some firms . . . 
benefit from their agents dealing fairly with outsiders, in which case good 
agent character goes with good general character.  Other firms, however, 
benefit from their agents dealing unfairly with outsiders, in which case good 
agent character goes with bad character.”276 
The benefits associated with each strategy toward outsiders will depend on 
a complex set of considerations that relate to the characteristics of the market 
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in which the firm operates.  Don Langevoort, for instance, suggests that firms 
that operate in highly competitive markets will tend to have strong corporate 
cultures because of the role that culture can play in creating shared 
expectations that enable people to act predictably and make decisions more 
quickly.277  The internal trust, loyalty, and cooperation that characterize these 
firms can give them a competitive edge.  At the same time, these attributes 
“may produce a heightened level of aggressiveness toward non-members.”278  
As he elaborates: 
A firm in a very competitive market may well benefit from an internal culture 
where strong internal bonds . . . produce a set of attitudes that not only get the 
group “pumped up” but also inculcate the sense that competitors (and even 
customers, perhaps) are opponents in a contest.  That will legitimate more 
aggressive tactics than might otherwise be socially appropriate, which could be 
a form of competitive adaptation.279 
As Langevoort observes, the result may be little or no attention to interests 
“that have less immediate connection to the bottom line.”280 
The possibility—indeed, perhaps the likelihood—of such behavior is a 
lesson that emerges from much of the research on social identity and group 
processes.  Individuals have a pronounced tendency to identify with groups, 
sometimes in ways that deeply implicate their identities.  When they do so, the 
basic conclusion of this research is fairly simple: “To the extent that people’s 
group membership is a meaningful source of self-beliefs and self-esteem, it 
should promote implicit preference for the ingroup relative to outgroups.”281 
Once group identity is formed, it can trigger powerful visceral, non-
conscious judgments that automatically favor group members over others.  
Taking non-group interests into account then will require deliberately 
overriding these emotional reactions through conscious reasoning that requires 
greater cognitive effort.  Joshua Greene’s theory of the cognitive operations 
involved in deontological and consequentialist moral judgments can shed some 
light on this dynamic.282  Greene suggests that situations that involve impacts 
on people with whom we can personally identify tend to elicit non-conscious 
moral responses that we justify in the categorical terms that characterize 
deontological theory.  By contrast, “when harmful actions are sufficiently 
impersonal, they fail to push our emotional buttons, despite their seriousness, 
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and as a result we tend to think about them in a more detached, actuarial 
fashion.”283  The plight of a single child trapped in a mine shaft, for instance, 
can move us more than millions of children starving a hemisphere away. 
We can think of this in terms of concentric circles.  The closer that morally 
significant events are to the core, the more likely they are to trigger non-
conscious moral intuitions.  The further we move from this core, the more 
likely deliberate moral cognition will come into play.  Thus, situations that 
affect a person’s work group will tend to have more emotional salience than 
those that affect the larger organization in which she works—but those that 
affect the organization are likely to elicit a more visceral reaction than those 
that affect society at large.  The ability of employees to take account of the 
social impacts of their actions thus in some circumstance may require 
overcoming automatic emotional reactions that lead them to put the 
organization’s interest first.  This suggests that organizations that are genuinely 
interested in encouraging socially responsible behavior by their members may 
need to temper the very moral intuitions that they seek to elicit.  They will 
have to foster loyalty and commitment to the organization while encouraging 
moral awareness that extends beyond its boundaries. 
One way to do this can be to draw upon employees’ identification with the 
organization to stress the risks to the entity of behavior that is regarded as 
socially irresponsible.  Behavior that harms stakeholders also can injure the 
organization as a result of legal penalties, public criticism, consumer boycotts, 
and diminished social perception of the legitimacy of the organization.284  This 
can threaten the entity with which the employee identifies and the scheme of 
cooperation that it represents.  The desire to preserve the viability of this 
source of identity and to avoid letting down other participants in this scheme 
may provide motivation for taking the interests of stakeholders into account.  
This approach involves the cultivation of more deliberate moral reasoning that 
considers the impact of behavior on “outsiders.”  It thus serves as a 
counterweight to visceral responses that may unreflectively favor the 
organization’s immediate interest.  At the same time, it can have motivational 
force because it relies on the emotional resonance of the employee’s 
identification with the organization. 
Focusing on the risks of socially irresponsible behavior need not require 
that the employee identify with stakeholder interests or even regard them 
important.  It is sufficient that she see stakeholder concerns as pragmatic 
constraints on the organization’s pursuit of narrow self-interest. 
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Sensitivity to the impact of her actions on the organization may also 
prompt an employee to develop a more expansive sense of responsibility for 
behavior that affects parties outside the organization.  Behavior that harms 
stakeholders can also injure the organization, as a result of legal penalties, 
public criticism, consumer boycotts, and the like.  This can threaten the success 
of the scheme of cooperation that the entity represents.  The desire to avoid 
letting down other participants in this scheme may provide motivation for 
taking the interests of stakeholders into account. 
This is not to say that appeals to be sensitive to stakeholder interests should 
focus only on this rationale, eschewing efforts to cultivate a wider sense of 
civic responsibility.  Those efforts also can rely on appeals to interdependence, 
and on the idea of society as an even larger cooperative effort that can be 
unraveled by certain behavior.  It will require identification with a more 
abstract community than the organization, and more reliance on moral 
reasoning that involves even greater cognitive effort.  Organizational leaders 
will need to be credible about their commitment to larger social values for this 
kind of appeal to be effective.  If they can do this, they may be able to tap into 
employees’ desires for involvement in socially meaningful activities.  Still, 
while particular events may elicit expansive conceptions of social identity and 
interdependence, it is difficult to say how durable these understandings are 
likely to be on a day-to-day basis. 
It is worth mentioning at least one final complication likely to beset any 
effort to inhibit intuitions that lead people to favor group over nongroup 
interests.  An organizational culture that promotes cooperation enlists 
automatic moral intuitions to make interaction among its agents smooth and 
relatively predictable.  We can think of these intuitions as heuristics that enable 
individuals to respond rapidly as events unfold.285  Further, responses such as 
sympathy, loyalty, and commitment lessen the need for negotiation, provide 
motivation for other-regarding behavior, and furnish guidance in ambiguous 
situations.  This all increases the organization’s productivity in achieving its 
objectives. 
Any effort to temper moral intuitions by encouraging slower, more 
deliberate moral reasoning processes runs the risk of reducing these benefits.  
Attempting to weigh the impacts of organizational actions on a wide range of 
stakeholders can be a time-consuming, imprecise process that generates 
disagreement and complicates decision-making.  Organizations thus may find 
it difficult to determine the optimal balance of heuristics and deliberation.  
Given the complexity of this task, the path of least resistance may well be to 
privilege the heuristics and limit efforts to induce decision-making that 
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requires more cognitive effort.  Such tendencies may be especially likely in, 
say, companies that operate in highly competitive markets, where seizing 
opportunities quickly may be crucial to survival.  This underscores that taking 
account of moral intuitions in analyzing and shaping organizational culture 
will be a complicated process, which requires sensitivity to the particular 
context in which a given organization must function. 
G. Summary 
Research on moral cognition suggests that fostering an ethical 
organizational culture requires a complex strategy.  An organization needs to 
elicit some non-conscious moral intuitions, while simultaneously trying to 
blunt the impact of others by encouraging more deliberate moral reasoning.  
Triggering salutary intuitions may be more successful the more that individuals 
regard the organization as a cooperative venture with which they identify.  
Emphasizing organizational values can enlist intrinsic motivation for ethical 
behavior, prompting the use of a perceptual frame that does not engage in cost-
benefit analysis in choosing among different courses of action.  Strong and 
consistent sanctions for misconduct can underscore the organization’s 
commitment to the values that it professes.  Finally, an organization will have 
greater success in these efforts if its members believe that it treats them in 
according with fair process. 
Both the increasing scale of organizations and the attenuation of loyalties 
between employees and employers will pose challenges to any attempt to 
promote a culture with which individuals strongly identify.  Moreover, the very 
success in fostering such identification can lead to reliance on other more 
pernicious intuitions that may lead individuals to favor the organization at the 
expense of its stakeholders.  Sensitivity to broader social interests therefore 
will require conscious efforts to take into account the impact of behavior on 
more abstract constituencies. 
All these observations are at a high level of generality, which neglects the 
ways in which the specific challenges that organizations face will depend on 
their particular characteristics.  The history of an organization, the types of 
goods or services that it provides, the competitiveness of the market in which it 
operates, its geographic scope, the technology on which it relies, and the 
personalities of the individuals in positions of authority are but a few of the 
variables that will shape the task of attempting to promote an ethical culture.  
More fine-grained analysis of the role of moral intuitions in organizational 
behavior ideally will provide greater insight into how these dynamics play out. 
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CONCLUSION 
Numerous observers have pointed out the limits of rule-following as a 
recipe for ethical behavior in the modern organization.  This has shifted focus 
to the elusive concept of culture as an ostensibly firmer foundation for virtuous 
conduct.  There is much to this critique and recommendation.  Even, however, 
if we make simplifying assumptions about the ability of organizational leaders 
to speak with one voice in conveying a set of consistent expectations that all 
members will interpret identically, creating and sustaining an ethical 
organizational culture faces significant challenges. 
Work in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics in recent years 
has emphasized that appreciating the operation and influence of non-conscious 
cognitive processes is crucial for anyone who hopes to shape behavior in 
organizations.  An important piece of the puzzle is gaining a better 
understanding of when and how responses arise that we think of as distinctly 
moral.  An emerging body of work on moral intuitions may help with this 
project.  It suggests that emotion plays a significant role in moral judgment, 
and that reasoning often is employed after, rather than prior to, making such 
judgments.  I have suggested, albeit in somewhat stylized fashion, how we 
might begin to draw on the insights of this research to enhance the likelihood 
of ethical behavior in organizations.  This is based on my belief that we should 
explore the possibility that “the mechanisms for changing the ethics of a 
culture lie in understanding the prototypes that are shared across the 
organization and the moral rules that are emphasized within the 
organization.”286 
Gaining a fuller appreciation of the nature of moral intuitions does not, of 
course, mean that we must accept the desirability of either particular intuitions 
or the process by which they arise.  Intuitions are a mixed bag.287  We may 
regard some as salutary, and thus as worth reinforcing, and others as 
pernicious, and therefore in need of countering.  As Joshua Greene suggests, 
our moral judgment may consist of “a complex hodgepodge of emotional 
responses and rational (re)constructions, shaped by biological and cultural 
forces, that do some things well and other things extremely poorly.”288 
Furthermore, despite the influence of moral intuitions, we also can be 
moved by moral reasoning that precedes, rather than simply follows, moral 
judgment in some cases.  Even if the research that I have described indicates 
that we tend to rely more on intuition and less on reasoning than we believe, 
we are capable in some circumstances of revising or overriding our intuitive 
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judgments based on conscious deliberation.  Ideally, further research will 
provide more insight into the conditions that are hospitable to this process. 
Before we begin to celebrate the steady march of reason in taming 
intuitions, however, I want to end on a note of caution.  We need to consider 
whether the accelerating demands on our attention in modern life are likely to 
reduce, rather than enhance, the role of deliberate reasoning.  It is a common 
complaint that we often feel inundated by a flood of stimulation and 
information, an increasing portion of which consists of visual cues that directly 
engage our emotions, much of which calls for virtually immediate replies from 
us.  As the chair of one large law firm observes: 
Today, because of the rapid pace of the business world and the demands of 
technology, we have a substantial amount of pressure to provide instantaneous 
responses.  From our desks, we summon the powers of technology to help us 
meet our clients’ demands for instantaneous responses.  That has reduced 
somewhat the opportunity for collegiality and collaboration, as well as the 
chance to be thoughtful and reflective, that we once enjoyed.  To some extent 
we have traded contemplation and collaboration for efficiency.289 
As a result, we may implicitly rely on moral intuitions in the coming years 
even more than we do now.  If this scenario is plausible, it underscores the 
urgency of better understanding the relationship between moral intuition and 
moral reasoning in the kind of complex beings that we are. 
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